

MCP

Model Context Protocol — Basics

Client & server roles · Tools / Resources / Prompts · Transport · Wire protocol



THE PROBLEM


Before MCP: every (LLM, tool) pair needs its own glue code



$N \times M$ hand-written integrations — one per (LLM, tool) pair

THE FIX

MCP: $N + M$, not $N \times M$



3 LLM adapters (N) + 3 MCP servers (M) = 6 pieces, not 9

MCP standardizes seam 2 only



Seam 1 (model ↔ harness): each LLM's native tool-call format (tool_use, tool_calls). Not MCP's concern — written once per LLM, reusable across every tool.

Seam 2 (harness ↔ tool): the one MCP standardizes — JSON-RPC 2.0. Written once per tool, reusable by any MCP client.

Tools, Resources, Prompts



TOOLS

Model-controlled

Actions. The model decides, mid-response, when to invoke one — e.g. `create_issue()`.



RESOURCES

Application-controlled

Read-only data. A user/client attaches it, like attaching a file — model never fetches it on its own.




PROMPTS

User-controlled

Reusable message templates. A user picks one (e.g. `/review-pr`); it fills in as if typed.

Not "what it does" — "who decides to use it"



The model never talks to the server directly

- 1 You type a message** in Claude Desktop (the client)
- 2 Client calls the model** message + tool list + any attached resources
- 3 Model returns tool_use** its native format — decides to call a tool
- 4 Client translates → MCP** sends tools/call (JSON-RPC) to the server
- 5 Server executes + returns** e.g. hits the real GitHub API
- 6 Client feeds result back** model reads it, writes the final answer

Control-model $\neq$ safety guarantee



Resources being application-controlled reduces one risk: the model spontaneously pulling in data a human never chose to expose.



It does NOT reduce content-injection risk: a Tool that returns data (read_file, search_docs) carries the exact same risk as a Resource once its content lands in context.

The real boundary: any untrusted content entering context is dangerous, regardless of which primitive delivered it.

→ ties to the "lethal trifecta": private data access + untrusted content + external comms (OWASP LLM Security track)

STDIO vs. HTTP



STDIO

- Client spawns server as a child process
- JSON-RPC piped over stdin / stdout
- No network, no ports
- 1 client : 1 server, same machine
- Local tools: filesystem, local git



Streamable HTTP

- Server runs remotely, over the network
- Client sends JSON-RPC as HTTP POST
- Server can stream multiple events back
- Many clients : 1 server
- Shared/hosted tools: company Jira, GitHub

Sticky sessions don't scale — REST's reasoning applies here too

STATEFUL (old)

Server remembers each client across requests → that client's requests must hit the same instance ("sticky sessions"). Instance restarts lose the session. Hard to load-balance.

STATELESS (current)

Every request is independent — any instance can handle it. Freely add / remove / restart instances behind a load balancer. Same scaling model as ordinary REST APIs.

JSON-RPC 2.0 — tools/list → tools/call

REQUEST

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/list"
}
```

RESPONSE

```
{
  "result": {
    "tools": [{
      "name": "create_issue",
      "inputSchema": { ... }
    }]
  }
}
```

CALLING IT

```
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 2,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "create_issue",
    "arguments": {
      "repo": "x",
      "title": "y"
    }
  }
}
```

MCP Basics, in one line

"MCP standardizes the tool side of integration — harness ↔ tool — turning $N \times M$ bespoke glue code into N reusable adapters + M reusable servers."

Client / Server

App-side harness ↔ tool-side process, JSON-RPC 2.0

Tools / Resources / Prompts

model / app / user — that's the whole taxonomy

Model never calls the server

the harness always mediates, both directions

STDIO vs. HTTP

local 1:1 process pipe vs. remote many:1 network service

Stateless scaling

any request, any instance — same model as REST

Advanced MCP

- Auth evolution — OAuth 2.1 retrofit
- July 2026 stateless spec redesign, in depth
- Security surface — STDIO/RCE exposure (~200K servers), lethal trifecta
- MCP vs. A2A vs. ACP — the protocol landscape
- Production patterns — registries, gateways, dynamic tool lists
- MCP Apps extension